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NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-  
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# Africa Review

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AFRICA REVIEW (U)

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Tanzania-Uganda: Mediation Unlikely (U)

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) and some individual African states are attempting to mediate between Tanzania and Uganda, but their efforts are likely to fail. Despite some conciliatory public statements, Tanzanian President Nyerere is clearly determined to pursue the overthrow of Ugandan President Idi Amin. (S)

Nyerere's Speech

The depth of Nyerere's commitment to Amin's downfall shows through in a speech to party and government leaders in Dar es Salaam on 28 February. When examined against the background of Tanzanian culture, the speech makes clear why--in Nyerere's view--mediation is impossible. (S)

When Nyerere gave his speech, the Tanzania People's Defense Forces (TPDF) had taken both Masaka and Mbarara in southern Uganda, forcing Ugandan troops to withdraw toward Kampala for an eventual defense of the capital. Mediation attempts by the OAU were still in process, and while Amin was amenable to a negotiated settlement of the border conflict, Nyerere continued to be intransigent. (U)

Parable of the Thief

Nyerere explained that his speech was intended "to dispel any doubts in your minds" about his position on the Ugandan conflict. He then said:

If your neighbor has stolen from your house, the thief will usually flee if he gets the chance. When he has got what he wanted, he flees and for your part you will try to chase him. A person who does not understand the real reason for the thief's flight and questions your chasing him, saying that you are the aggressor and stopping you in your pursuit, assists the thief by this action. He might argue that he wants to mediate, but at the same time this is a type of mediation geared toward aiding the thief. (U)

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This parable with its readily identifiable actors (the thief, Amin; the aggrieved neighbor, Tanzania; the well-intentioned but uninformed mediator, the OAU) permits Nyerere to justify his continued "chase" of Amin. (S)

Nyerere is making more than a simple analogy. Among the societies of East Africa, theft has traditionally been considered a crime of singular proportion.\* Even today, the cry of Mwizi! (Swahili for thief) in a Dar es Salaam street energizes otherwise placid pedestrians into mob pursuit of the fleeing suspect. (U)

Traditional Tanzanian society condemns the thief not because he acts against another individual, but because he violates the rule of sharing, a fundamental principle in communalistic societies. The community must ensure respect for this principle if its social structure is to survive. The procedure for identifying the thief and the process of reconciliation between him and the aggrieved party requires the intervention of the community or its representative. (U)

Once the thief is identified, every possible step is taken to reestablish the social equilibrium upset by the infraction. If the thief refuses to admit guilt, fails to make compensation, or refuses to repair the broken relationship with the aggrieved party, the community can no longer admit the thief to its protection and he becomes an outcast. To Nyerere's audience the speech meant that in the first instance it is the responsibility of the larger African community--as represented by the OAU--to deal with the disruption caused by Amin's October 1978 invasion of Tanzania. But if the OAU does not take action against Amin, the aggrieved party--Tanzania--must take responsibility. (S)

\*A thief is not only capable of taking material things. If he is a mchawi (Swahili for witch), he can steal sexual potency, faculties of the mind, even the power of life itself. The mchawi obviously is a much greater threat to the community than the ordinary thief. If material goods are stolen, ordinary measures will do; but if the thief employs witchcraft, extraordinary means--requiring the services of a mganga (Swahili for traditional "doctor")--must be used. (U)

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Thus, Nyerere called for the OAU to condemn Amin, who must admit the crime, but at the same time suggested he did not expect it to respond. He ended his remarks to the OAU with the following challenge: "If you cannot deal with him, then let us alone to deal with him." (S)

### Outlook

Nyerere's present position on mediation appears intractable. He has established the case that Amin cannot be trusted as a neighbor. By casting Amin as a thief, and by characterizing the OAU as impotent, Nyerere reveals that he does not expect Amin to recant or the OAU to intercede. Nyerere himself is thus obliged to see that Amin is cast out of the African political "community." (S) (SECRET)

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Uganda: Ethnic Factors in the Post-Amin Period (U)

Ethnic and regional factors--always important in Uganda--are likely to play an important role in any regime that might take over if President Amin is ousted. Before Amin seized power in 1971, the influence of ethnic and regional divisions was very much in evidence, and under his rule a major change in the ethnic/regional power balance has taken place and aggravated existing animosities. In a post-Amin period this balance is likely to shift again, initiating a new period of instability. (U)

Amin is currently under more pressure than at any time in the past eight years. Tanzanian forces occupy a large sector of southern Uganda and reportedly are preparing to advance toward the capital. Reports indicate a high Ugandan desertion rate, and a tendency simply to fade into the bush when Tanzanian forces are encountered. The Ugandan military is undisciplined, and many are of questionable loyalty to Amin. Promotion on the basis of political favoritism of semiliterate, uneducated northerners to positions of authority has created intense resentment among southerners and northerners of other tribes and religions. (S)

Restructuring Uganda by any successor regime will be complicated by deep-seated ethnic rivalries, regardless of whether it is undertaken by northerners in the military, by traditional southern leaders, or by groups now in exile. (U)

The Ethnic Factor

Uganda has some 42 different ethnic groups, representing four linguistic families--Bantu (mainly in the south), Nilotic, Nilo-Hamitic, and Sudanic (all primarily in the north). Languages in the same family are structurally similar and more or less mutually intelligible; those in different families are structurally different

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and mutually unintelligible. Linguistic differences profoundly affect the level of communication between ethnic groups and inhibit feelings of national unity. (U)

Ugandan ethnic groups are divided in two ways. One division is between the Bantu to the south of Lake Kyoga and the non-Bantu to the north of the lake. While no single ethnic group is large enough to be politically dominant, the southern Bantu, located in the economic heartland of the country, together account for about 65 percent of the population. Because of geographic differences in the rate of modernization, many northerners have migrated south to take advantage of economic opportunities and some degree of ethnic mixing has occurred in the south. (U)

The second important division is among the Bantu speakers. Linguistic and cultural differences and competition for political power have kept the Bantu speakers from forming any effective long-term coalition. Cooperation, when it occurs, is generally within the same language family, but the general rule is conflict. Internal differences among the Bantu speakers have traditionally been so strong that effective organized opposition to any unpopular ruler--foreign or Ugandan--has been difficult to achieve. (U)

The Baganda,\* located along the shore of Lake Victoria, are the largest (about 16 percent of the total) and wealthiest group of Ugandans. The central location of their area--and its excellent soils and ample rainfall--enables them to earn their living from agriculture and to grow sufficient quantities of coffee to make it the country's most important export crop. About 60 percent of the agricultural land in Buganda is devoted to cash crops, in contrast to about 30 percent for the country as a whole. (U)

The Baganda traditionally had a highly centralized tribal political system but they have not been well represented in Uganda's military or police, probably because of the wide range of alternative opportunities

\*Baganda refers to the people and Buganda to the area they occupy.

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open to them. They tend to exercise less political influence than their numbers would indicate and have never formed longstanding coalitions with other ethnic groups. During the colonial period, the British considered Buganda to be the most advanced area of the country and frequently used Baganda as administrators in other areas. This reinforced the Baganda view that they were superior to other Ugandans, and caused non-Baganda to perceive them unfavorably. Poor northerners, migrating to Buganda to seek jobs, resented Baganda control, which aggravated north-south divisions. Other Bantu groups--formed into three other centralized kingdoms--exhibited similar characteristics. (S)

#### Conflicts Under Obote

Former President Milton Obote, an Acholi from the north (some sources indicate he is a Lango), was supported by an alliance of Acholi and Lango peoples who had traditionally dominated the military. Combined, these two groups accounted for only 10 percent of the total population of Uganda, but formed 30 percent of the non-Bantu northern population and about 40 percent of the armed forces. Obote sought to establish a unitary state in which the more populous and influential groups--especially the Baganda--could not dominate his northern supporters. (S)

Conflict between Obote and the Baganda was inevitable. At independence Obote was named Prime Minister, and the Kabaka (King) of the Baganda became President. Obote's pursuit of socialist development was in direct conflict with the capitalist tendencies of the southerners. In 1966, he seized control of the government, introduced a new constitution, and had himself proclaimed President by Parliament. The new constitution abolished the Kingdom of Baganda and the other southern Kingdoms and forced the Kabaka into exile in London. Later, Obote carried out a bloody purge of those who resisted the changes. (U)

#### The Amin Era

In 1977, Amin--then Uganda's senior military officer--ousted Obote. A Sudanic-speaking Kakwa from one

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of the smallest ethnic groups, Amin initially was popular with the southerners, if only because Obote was so intensely disliked. Amin curried additional favor with the Baganda when he allowed the body of the Kabaka to be returned from London for burial in Uganda, but soon lost popularity when the southerners realized that he was simply replacing north-central (Acholi-Lango) rule with north-western (Kakwa-"Nubian")\* rule. In recent years, because of declining political support within the country, Amin has been forced to rely increasingly on minority peoples from the northwest to maintain his only power base--the military. (S)

"Nubians" were always well represented in the Army because a military career offered a chance for a young Nubian to substantially improve his prospects. But Amin increased the numbers and dominance of the "Nubians" in the military through selective recruitment and promotion of his ethnic brothers, many of them from the border areas of neighboring Sudan and Zaire. Predominately Muslim, they differ from most other Ugandans in religion as well as culture. (S)

#### Leadership Prospects

Detailed accurate information on the current ethnic makeup of Uganda is unavailable. Most institutions capable of providing leadership have been destroyed or severely damaged; the badly shaken military is one of the few viable organizations remaining. (S)

The Army will probably play a critical role in the post-Amin era. If Amin alone is removed, leaving the "Nubian" dominated military leadership intact, and if the men in the ranks follow their leadership, changes will be minimal. But if chaotic conditions follow Amin's ouster and large numbers of Nubians flee the country, chances are good that the remaining southern officers could assert themselves and possibly provide some measure of stability. In either case, a return to civilian rule is unlikely. (S)

\*"Nubians" are members of northern ethnic groups--Acholi, Kakwa, Lugbara, and others--who have converted to Islam and the cultural practices of the southern Sudanese. (S)

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Still another possibility is that leadership will be provided by an exile group or even by the reinstatement of Milton Obote as President, though the latter seems remote at this time. Amin's systematic decimation of the previously powerful Acholi and Lango peoples has probably destroyed their internal leadership potential, though significant numbers of them were in exile in Tanzania with Obote. We can assume that the Baganda have also suffered politically and economically under Amin's rule, but the current leadership potential among the Bantu is unknown. Bantu resurgence is possible, but cooperation would have to occur at a level rarely exhibited before. (S)

The number, capabilities, and ethnic affiliation of exiles who may return when Amin is removed is the largest unknown in the equation. Regardless of what government emerges, the longstanding north-south differences and the rivalries within each bloc that have been manifested throughout this century are not likely to cease. (S) (SECRET)

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Rhodesia: Nkomo's Diminished Options (U)

Joshua Nkomo, leader of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), seems to have run out of political options, at least for the time being. As a result, he has become locked into a military course of action that could prove disastrous in the long run for him and for ZAPU. To revive his political fortunes, Nkomo needs either an accommodation with the government in Salisbury or a new international push for a political settlement. (C)

Nkomo's Decline

Several factors have contributed to Nkomo's decline. His fragile Patriotic Front alliance with Robert Mugabe, leader of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), has all but collapsed. The alliance was never more than a framework for the two leaders to coordinate a negotiating position, but it provided the platform Nkomo needed in order to maintain his position as the senior nationalist leader. In the absence of international negotiations, the Patriotic Front has lost its reason for being, thus depriving Nkomo of an important publicity tool. (C)

The shooting down of a second Rhodesian civilian airliner in February by ZAPU guerrillas has made an accommodation with the transitional government in Salisbury much more difficult. Until recently, Nkomo was able to exploit the transitional government's eagerness to bring him into the internal settlement to show how important his participation was to a successful settlement. Moreover, it provided him with a convenient option of last resort. (C)

In addition, Mugabe has emerged as Nkomo's equal in the external nationalist movement, largely because of ZANU's increasing strength inside Rhodesia. About 7,000 ZANU guerrillas are reportedly inside the country, compared with about 2,000 ZAPU guerrillas. ZANU's growing strength has enabled Mugabe to win international

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recognition in his own right rather than as Nkomo's junior partner. It has also encouraged him to try, unsuccessfully so far, to break Nkomo's monopoly on Soviet assistance. (S NF NC OC)

### Nkomo's Options

Nkomo's loss of political options has left him no choice but a military course. He probably realizes, nonetheless, that the military option holds a number of dangers. Any major step-up in the fighting against the Rhodesian security forces would result in heavy casualties and increase tensions between the military and civilian leaders within ZAPU. Moreover, it would place ZAPU on a collision course with ZANU. Given ZANU's growing strength inside Rhodesia and its broader tribal base, ZAPU might not be able to win such a showdown. Even if ZAPU proved capable of holding its own, Nkomo's leadership would be thrown open to challenge by military rivals within ZAPU. In addition, the military option runs against the grain of Nkomo's principal backer--Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda--who prefers a political settlement to an increase in Zambian, not to mention Soviet and Cuban, involvement. (S NF NC OC)

Given the gloomy military prospects, Nkomo may try to revive his political fortunes by making another attempt at accommodation with the Salisbury regime. He might do so before the transfer of power to the government of national unity takes place in the belief that Bishop Abel Muzorewa, the most likely winner in the April elections, would be less inclined to strike a deal with him than Prime Minister Smith would be. Nkomo would find it difficult if not impossible to approach Smith, but he might explore an accommodation indirectly through other internal black leaders such as Ndabaningi Sithole, or Chief Chirau. (C)

A new international initiative toward a settlement would help to revive Nkomo's fortunes. It would be beyond his ability to control, but it would put him back in the limelight. (U) (SECRET NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-ORCON)

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Nigeria: Preelection Politicking Intensifying (U)

Political campaigning in Nigeria, in anticipation of elections and a scheduled return to civilian rule next October, has intensified in recent weeks after an extended period of concentration by the country's five competing political parties on internal organization. The increase in politicking has been accompanied by some sporadic clashes between rival parties and warnings by state authorities against disorders. Apparently in response to recent incidents of political violence, General Obasanjo's government issued a tough nationwide public order decree late last month. It transfers primary responsibility for monitoring political campaigning from local police officials to state military administrators and sets stiff penalties for political violence and thuggery, problems that helped undermine the first republic. (C)

Despite its latest firm measure to deter violence, the regime does not feel that the transition is seriously threatened and is confident Nigeria will be returned to civilian rule on schedule. The new decree should reinforce the government's ability to keep political violence within bounds and Nigeria on track toward constitutional government. Nevertheless, Nigeria's greatest potential challenge could be to move successfully through state and national elections. The elections have not yet been scheduled and may not be held until summer. Only when Nigeria draws closer to voting will it become clear whether the political process becomes turbulent enough to force cancellation of civilian rule. (S)

The worst politically inspired violence to date erupted last January in the northern city of Kano. The two incidents involved followers of the major National Party, which represents the conservative northern Muslim political establishment, and those of the small Muslim-oriented People's Redemption Party whose reformist leadership seems especially confrontation prone. Nigerian security officials expect that clashes between the two parties will continue to be a periodic but manageable

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problem. They reportedly are more worried about the possibility of serious clashes between the National Party and the predominantly southern Yoruba-based Unity Party. (S NF NC OC)

The electoral strengths of the various Nigerian parties (see chart) are difficult to judge because of the lack of reliable political data. Beneath the facade of 13 years of military rule, several potentially important sociological changes have taken place that could affect Nigerian voting behavior. The influence of local traditional rulers has eroded in varying degrees, educational levels have increased, and urbanization has accelerated. (C)

As in the past, voters in rural areas, where the bulk of Nigeria's population still resides, are generally expected to vote along ethnic and regional lines and to be more receptive to political guidance by local chiefs. Voters in the larger urban centers, who are presumed to be more "detrified" and politically aware than their rural countrymen, may be more influenced by party stands on contemporary social and economic issues. Thus, the two parties with the strongest populist platforms--the Unity Party and the People's Redemption Party--may have considerable appeal among urban dwellers. (C)

At this point, most Nigerians consider the National Party, based in the more populous far north, to be the frontrunner, with the Unity Party, Nigerian People's Party, Great Nigerian People's Party, and People's Redemption Party following in that order. Still, the party lineup could change dramatically. Most observers expect several party mergers after the first round of elections\* when party strengths and weaknesses become evident. Further party realignments will occur in the probable event that a presidential runoff is necessary. (S)

Nnamdi Azikiwe's financially impoverished Nigerian People's Party seems the most eager at this time for a

\*Tentative government planning had originally called for a series of five elections in ascending order for state legislative assemblies, the federal house of representatives, the federal senate, state governorships, and the federal presidency. In order to adhere to the October target date for transition to civilian rule, the regime undoubtedly will have to combine some of the elections. (C)

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Nigerian Political Parties

<u>Party Name</u>	<u>National Candidates-- Tribal Affiliation</u>	<u>Orientation</u>
<u>Major Parties</u>		
National Party	President: Shehu Shagari (Fulani) Vice President: Alex Ekueme (Ibo)	Northern Muslim oriented and dominated by major Hausa-Fulani ethnic group; has some support among major southern tribes and minority tribes of Nigeria's middle belt; generally conservative, right-wing cast.
Nigerian People's Party	President: Nnamdi Azikiwe (Ibo) Vice President: not yet chosen	Based heavily on major southern Ibo ethnic group, eastern minority tribes, and middle belt support; moderate centrist group.
Unity Party	President: Obafemi Awolowo (Yoruba) Vice President: Phillip Umeadi (Ibo)	Based primarily on major southern Yoruba ethnic group with little support elsewhere; left-of-center populist stance.
<u>Minor Parties</u>		
Great Nigerian People's Party	President: Waziri Ibrahim (Kanuri) Vice President: Benjamin Nzeribe (Ibo)	Dissident northern Muslim faction with a small scattering of southern support; moderate centrist grouping.
People's Redemption Party	President: Aminu Kano (Fulani) Vice President: Samuel Ikoku (Ibo)	Alliance of anti-traditional northerners, with a reformist and xenophobic outlook, and progressive southern Ibos. (U)

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merger or some form of electoral alliance to bolster its prospects. It has its sights on the two minor northern-based parties--the Great Nigerian People's Party and the People's Redemption Party, but recent negotiations have proved fruitless. Thus, all three groups will probably go it alone for now. Nevertheless, Azikiwe's predominantly southern Ibo-based party reportedly is benefiting from some additional support from former northern adherents of the National Party and the Great Nigerian People's Party who are unhappy over intraparty squabbles or their failure to be named party candidates for public office. As a result, Azikiwe's party may select its vice-presidential candidate from the Muslim north in hopes of picking up some votes in an area it had largely written off. (C) (SECRET NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-ORCON)

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Djibouti: Calm Continues (U)

President Gouled was warmly received in Djibouti's Afar and Issa ethnic areas during a tour of provincial capitals last month. The uninspiring Gouled, who has managed to maintain his country's independence, may with luck be able to continue the feat for some time. Given Djibouti's poor foundation for independence and fragile political institutions, however, competing interests of the Afars and Issas and meddling by neighboring Ethiopia and Somalia could easily upset the situation. (C)

Gouled's trip was his first extensive tour of the interior since the pre-independence referendum and election in May 1977. Gouled promised more attention to the countless needs of Djibouti's neglected interior, including the establishment of municipal local governments in many of the smaller towns and villages. (C)

Prime Minister Bourkat Gourad, who was appointed last October, has avoided confrontations with the President. The previous Prime Ministers, all Afars like Bourkat Gourad, continuously challenged the President, an Issa, on domestic and foreign issues. This played into the hands of radicals on both sides, leading to continued crises within Djibouti. Bourkat's reluctance to challenge the President is more the result of the Prime Minister's retiring nature than the product of any significant improvement in ethnic relations. (S)

Djibouti continues to steer a neutral course in its relations with its two neighbors, Ethiopia and Somalia, which have traditionally had designs on the country and are involved in covert attempts to further their national interests there. In pursuing its goals, Somalia has worked through the ethnically related Issas; Ethiopia has similarly employed the Afars. (S)

Somalia has lost substantial influence with the Djibouti Government over the past year. While Isaas are the dominant group, most were quick to recognize

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military realities after the Ethiopian victory over Somalia last March. Some hardline, pro-Somali Issas still have access to President Gouled, but their influence has diminished. (C)

The Somali Government, however, is still capable of causing problems within Djibouti. Mogadiscio has a number of diverse economic holdings in the country, using Djibouti nationals as fronts. Somalia also has strong influence in the Djibouti security service, the fledgling Army, and workers in the port and railroad to Addis Ababa--the country's only economic assets. However, Somali activity has, at times, prompted Djibouti to arrest Somali nationals or their Issa allies for anti-government or disruptive activity. (S NF)

For their part, the Ethiopians are watchful for any sign of increasing Somali influence in Djibouti. Addis Ababa regards access to the port as vital to its foreign trade and expects the cooperation of the Djibouti Government to insure it. To protect its interests, the Ethiopians have been training radical Afar youth in terrorist and guerrilla activity. The Ethiopians are playing on Afar hatred of the Issas and the desire of the younger generation of Djibouti to bring about political change. There have been reports that the lack of activity by the dissidents, some of whom began training in mid-1978, has led to morale problems and some weakening of the exile organizations. The Ethiopians, however, will probably refrain from unleashing the radical Afars as long as they see no shift in Djibouti's policy toward Somalia. A recent Ethiopian shakeup of the exiles' leadership has caused some of the Afar leaders who lost out to attempt a reconciliation with Gouled's government. (S NF NC OC)

The calm of the last six months has given the government some breathing room. The prospect of internal development programs offered by Gouled and efforts to establish a government presence in the small villages could help establish credibility and support. (C)

The government, however, still has serious obstacles to overcome. Little has been done, for example, to defuse tribal animosity or to introduce such basic institutions as a constitution. Ethiopia and Somalia

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continue to meddle in Djibouti, and the recent opening of the Soviet Embassy adds to the potential for unrest, especially in view of the government's inadequate security service. (SECRET NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-ORCON)

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Zaire: Student Unrest (U)

In late February and early this month, President Mobutu was confronted by student demonstrations at the Kinshasa and Lubumbashi campuses of the University of Zaire. The short-lived student outbursts were sparked by inadequate government stipends for the students, a shortage of food in the campus cafeterias, and the absence of basic services such as running water. The demonstrations come at a time when the Mobutu government feels threatened by various internal and external political forces and popular dissatisfaction is at a high point. Student demonstrators tried to draw parallels to Iran, calling one government representative the "Shah of Shaba" and referring to a student leader as the "Ayatollah." (C)

The problems on university campuses are to some extent a reflection of Zairian society as a whole. Corruption is rife in the university administration, and the rolls of students and employees are swollen by non-existent people listed for the purpose of collecting government fees. The periodic food shortages are widely believed to be caused by the diversion of funds by government officials more concerned for the health of their commercial ventures than that of the students. (C)

Faculty and students often criticize Mobutu's regime privately, but expressions of discontent have usually been restrained and unorganized. Although university students have habitually complained about campus conditions, they are still beholden to a government that literally feeds and clothes them. In a society where jobs are difficult to find they are hesitant to risk their benefits by engaging in public protest. The university population could nevertheless become a serious problem, particularly if the interests and grievances of the students and the Zairian public, already disaffected, should converge, leading to widespread civil disorder. (C)

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Although Zairian students have been relatively quiescent in recent years, they have at times been a problem for Mobutu. In 1969, striking students appealed to poorly paid troops in Kinshasa to join them in a protest over low pay and stipends. A few did, but the protest ended quickly when other troops were ordered to fire on the students. (C)

Mobutu dealt quickly with the recent student disturbances. He personally visited the campus at Kinshasa, listened to grievances, and ordered water service restored and food delivered. Control at both campuses was reestablished with minimum force, but intrinsic malaise remains, and Mobutu could well face a new dilemma. By responding with conciliatory gestures, the government has demonstrated the efficacy of student protest. If Mobutu is unable to meet future demands or if the army were to overreact to student violence, anti-government demonstrations by the students could easily get out of hand. (C)

This time the students made no attempt to enlist the support of the local population, nor did they receive any, no doubt because of fear of the government's pervasive security apparatus. The students did, however, show some signs of organization. If the government does not follow up with significant reform, Mobutu's "bandaid" approach to solving the students' grievances could lead to renewed confrontation between the government and the students. (C) (CONFIDENTIAL)

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Comoros Islands: Prospects for Abdallah's Regime (U)

In May, the Comoros Islands will mark the first anniversary of the coup that overthrew Ali Soilih's three-year socialist regime. The new government led by President Ahmed Abdallah was harshly denounced by most African nations because it was installed by European mercenaries, whose leader, Bob Denard, stayed on until last September in a key government position.\* Although the Comoros' international standing is slowly improving, the domestic situation has changed little; there are few signs of popular support for the government, and the economy is totally dependent on foreign aid. It is too early to tell whether Abdallah's move from a progressive Marxist society to a Western-style republic will produce favorable results. (S)

International Relations

Since Denard's departure, the Abdallah regime has begun to win international acceptance. Although most Indian Ocean countries initially regarded Denard's coup as a dangerous precedent, some, such as Mauritius and the Seychelles, are negotiating an inter-island fishing consortium with the Comoros. The island republic was readmitted to the Organization of African Unity (OAU) during the Khartoum summit last month after having been expelled last July because of its cozy relationship with Denard's mercenaries. Official relations with most black African countries, however, have yet to be established. (S NF NC OC)


France, which refused to provide aid to the islands until Denard left, has established diplomatic relations with the Abdallah government. Paris hopes that its

\*Abdallah himself was ousted by Denard in 1975, three months after the Comoros became independent from France. (S)

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military and economic aid will lead to a better environment to negotiate the reintegration of Mayotte into the Comoros; Mayotte voted to remain a French overseas department when the Comoros gained independence in 1975.\*  
(S)

### The Domestic Situation

The gradual international acceptance of the Comoros has already alleviated one major problem, the large current-account deficit. French aid, IMF loans, and grants from the Saudis are supporting the economy, although the long-term results of these and other foreign assistance packages depend in large part on how the President chooses to distribute them. (C)

Abdallah has funneled most foreign aid into security and military development. The French are training an army, and privately hired European military "technicians" have organized a 250-man presidential guard. (C)

Abdallah's concentration on internal security and military concerns has been at the expense of the Comorian economy. He recently claimed, however, that he will focus on improving the islands' economy, which is crucial to winning popular support. Most Comorians are subsistence farmers and would welcome even a marginal rise in their low income level. (S)

Western observers doubt Abdallah's sincerity. They describe him as more committed to personal financial gain than national concerns. As the wealthiest landowner on the islands, the President considers the Comoros primarily a business venture and reportedly told one government creditor that he intends to reimburse himself from government coffers for what he lost during Soilih's reign. (C)

Abdallah alone makes major decisions, even though the constitution specifies that he cooperate with an

\*Mayotte, the most prosperous of the Comoros Islands, rejected membership in the Comorian Government in the belief that such a union would work to its economic disadvantage. France has been harshly criticized by the African countries for its retention of Mayotte and would like to see the island reintegrated. (S)

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elected national assembly and three governors. Furthermore, his economic plans are vague, and he has taken no concrete steps to improve the economy since his decision last fall to revert from government-controlled monopolies to a free enterprise system. (C)

In addition to the country's economic difficulties, Abdallah faces the challenge of reconciling those factions that fared well under Soilih's regime with those that have become more powerful since Soilih's departure. Students, who ran "popular committees" under Soilih and are resentful of the sudden renewal of their elders' status, have demonstrated against Abdallah. Progressive politicians and former members of Soilih's Tanzanian-trained security force also oppose the new government. (S)

#### Outlook

Despite many obstacles, the government still has a good chance of enlisting popular support if Abdallah can restrain his acquisitive instincts and concentrate on effective government. He is under considerable pressure to do so, given the threat that the French will probably withdraw aid if he refuses. (S) (SECRET NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-ORCON)

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Angola: The Ethnic and Regional Basis of the Political Movements (U)

Support for political organizations in Angola, as in other African countries, generally follows ethnic and regional lines. Each of the three major political movements in preindependence Angola drew most of its support from a single regionally based tribal group. Little else is known about the current ethnic and regional strength of each, now that one has become the recognized government, another is waging an extensive insurgency, and the third, for all practical purposes, no longer exists as a political force in the country. This article, although admittedly written from sketchy and conflicting information, assesses the support for each of them. It is condensed from a longer paper to be published later. (U)

The Demographic and Ethnic Background

The population of Angola, according to a UN estimate on 1 January, was 6,527,000. Although current information is lacking, blacks probably make up about 98 percent of the total population, mulattos no more than 2 percent; whites, who composed about 5 percent of the population prior to Angolan independence in 1975, probably now total only a few thousand, well under 1 percent. (U)

The Portuguese, like other colonial powers on the continent, stressed and encouraged tribal differences. This policy discouraged a unified resistance to Portuguese rule and contributed to the development of the three liberation groups during the colonial period. Tribal lines nonetheless have become increasingly blurred, particularly in urban areas. There are more than 100 distinguishable tribes in the country. Despite the large number of tribes, more than 90 percent of the black population belongs to five major tribal groups--the Ovimbundu, Kimbundu, Bakongo, Chokwe-Lunda, and Ganguela. The following table gives the approximate percentage of the total for each of these groups. (U)

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## ANGOLA: ETHNIC COMPOSITION\* (U)

Group	Percentage of Total	Numbers
Blacks	98	6,396,460
	<u>Percent of Blacks</u>	
Ovimbundu	36	2,302,000
Kimbundu	27	1,727,000
Bakongo	12	768,000
Chokwe-Lunda	8	512,000
Ganguela	8	512,000
Cuanyama (Ovambo)	1	63,000
Others	8	512,000
Mulattos	2	120,540
Whites	-	10,000
Total	100	6,527,000

The Political Movements

Anti-Portuguese liberation movements emerged in Angola in the early 1950s. By the mid-1960s, they had evolved into the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), now the governing body in Angola; the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), the government's major political and military opponent; and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), now weakened and ineffective. Each drew the bulk of its support from a single tribal group (Kimbundu, Ovimbundu, and Bakongo respectively). Portugal, taking into account the tribal and regional underpinnings of this support and its own weakened position in the colony following the Lisbon coup in April 1974, turned Angola over to a

\*Percentages of the major black groups are commensurate with their percentages in the 1950 census, the last census for which tribal data is available. The figures for the Bakongo are the least reliable. Several hundred thousand fled to Zaire (then the Democratic Republic of the Congo) after an abortive revolt against the Portuguese in 1961; data is lacking on the numbers that have since returned. Numbers for the mulattos and whites are rough estimates. (U)

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government of national unity consisting of the three movements in January 1975. But they had fought the Portuguese separately for a considerable period and were unwilling to submerge their differences; civil war erupted in mid-1975 and continued after independence in November of that year. Spheres of influence quickly developed: the MPLA, which controlled the government, was also dominant in the Kimbundu heartland in the north-central region and in the major cities; FNLA, the Bakongo stronghold in the far north; and UNITA, most of the south. These areas, which reflect tribal and regional divisions, have existed for centuries, and have changed little in the intervening three and a half years since independence. MPLA and UNITA have both attracted some support from the Chokwe-Lunda, Ganguela, and Ovambo, and other minor tribal groups. FNLA has remained essentially a Bakongo organization. (U)

The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola  
(UNITA)

UNITA was formed by Jonas Savimbi, an Ovimbundu and still the leader, in 1966. He had broken with the FNLA and its leader, Holden Roberto, in 1964. (U)

The area of UNITA strength encompasses most of the southern half of the country, except for the southwest and the major cities. The core of its strength lies in the densely settled and economically well-developed Ovimbundu provinces of Huambo and Bie. It draws most of its secondary support from the lightly populated provinces of Moxico and Cuando Cubango. (U)

UNITA spokesmen claim that it is a nontribal organization that has the backing not only of the Ovimbundu but of all other southern tribes as well. MPLA officials, on the other hand, charge that UNITA is an Ovimbundu organization and has little support from non-Ovimbundu tribes. [REDACTED] claims that MPLA officials will privately acknowledge that UNITA has greater support among the southern tribes than it acknowledges publicly.) Based on available information, the UNITA view is more nearly correct; UNITA does draw significant support from a number of non-Ovimbundu tribes in the south, especially from the Chokwe-Lunda, Ganguela, and Ovambo groups. All of these groups have

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been greatly influence by the Ovimbundu over the years. Southern loyalties unquestionably would favor UNITA, an indigenous group, over either the MPLA or FNLA, which are probably considered by most southerners--regardless of tribal affiliation--as outside organizations. These loyalties, however, would probably be less pronounced in the cities where ethnic and regional allegiances have to a greater extent broken down than in the countryside and where the MPLA has maintained a presence. (S)

There is little question that most Ovimbundu support UNITA. One of the three Ovimbundu chiefs claims that Jonas Savimbi is the only one of the nationalist leaders who understands the Ovimbundu. Agostinho Neto, he points out, is foremost a Kimbundu, is married to a white woman, lived a long time in Europe, and does not care about the Ovimbundu. The chief's attitude both to Savimbi and to Neto probably mirrors the attitudes of most Ovimbundu as well as those of the neighboring tribes who have been influenced by the Ovimbundu. (U)

A UNITA spokesman has claimed that UNITA has broadened its ethnic base since the inception of UNITA's insurgency against the Luanda government. It has integrated its combat units and recruited most of their strength in the regional commands from local populations. A US journalist who traveled with UNITA in 1973 and 1977 confirms the spokesman's claims. He observed that UNITA forces were recruited from 10 or 12 different southern tribes and that all of the villages and guerrilla camps that he visited were mixed and included members of the Chokwe-Lunda and Ganguela tribal groups that predominate in southeastern Angola. He reported that speeches at the 1977 UNITA congress were translated from Portuguese into the Ovimbundu, Chokwe, and Cuanyama (the principal Ovambo tribe) languages. He also noted, in 1977, that mulattos composed about 10 percent of the UNITA members that he interviewed and that there was a sprinkling of white membership (mostly Portuguese who had married Ovimbundu women). Two other American journalists who traveled with UNITA in 1976 also reported that the populations in the UNITA camps transcended tribal lines. (S)

When UNITA was formed in 1966, Savimbi and the other Ovimbundu who had left the FNLA because it was dominated

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by Bakongo provided the core of the new leadership. Today, the leadership in UNITA is still predominantly Ovimbundu, but does include representatives of several of the other major tribal groups. (There are no known mulattos in the top leadership.) Among the top leaders, Jonas Savimbi is an Ovimbundu; Jose Samuel Chiwale, the Military Commander in Chief, and Jorge Sangumba, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, are also believed to be Ovimbundu; Miguel Nzau Puna, the Secretary General, is a Bakongo from Cabinda; Waldemar Chidondo, the Army Chief of Staff, is from Cunene Province and probably a Cuanyama. Most tribal groups are represented in the leadership of the regional commands. For example, Antonio Vakulukuta, leader of the southern front (and also Secretary for Internal Affairs), is a Cuanyama; the chief of the Moxico General Staff is a member of the Ganguela tribal group. A number of UNITA representatives abroad are reported to be Cabindans and formerly members of the Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda Enclave (FLEC). (S)

Even though the southern cities are under the control of the central government, UNITA probably has the greatest tribal following of the three organizations. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) Conciliation Commission reported in 1975 that 2.5 million people, about 40 percent of the total population, supported UNITA. In 1976, Jonas Savimbi claimed that UNITA had the support of more than two-thirds of the Angolan population. Based on the sketchy information available to us on the current demographic and ethnic framework of Angola and on the extent of tribal support to the three major nationalist movements, tribal support for UNITA today probably breaks down as follows: most of the 2.3 million Ovimbundu, probably most of the 512,000 Ganguela, maybe half of the 512,000 Chokwe-Lunda and the 63,000 Ovambo (Cuanyama). It also draws much support from the remaining southern tribes (Haneca-Humbe, Herero, Xindonga), which combined probably number between 300,000 and 400,000. (C)

#### The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)

The MPLA was fomed in 1956 from a merger of smaller liberation movements. Its major area of operations against the Portuguese was in Moxico and Cuando Cubango provinces in the southeast. Today, its strength is in

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the cities and in the Kimbundu tribal area of the northwest. (Urban areas make up about 15 percent of the total Angolan population according to the 1970 census.) MPLA is also dominant in most of the rest of the country north of the Benguela railroad (except for areas where remnants of the FNLA still operate in the far north) and in the southwest. The MPLA, however, does not have strong support and only rudimentary organization in large parts of these areas, especially in the southwest. (C)

The MPLA draws the bulk of its support from the 1.7 million-strong Kimbundu tribal group as well as from the urban middle class (including whites, assimilados, and mulattos). Racial and tribal divisions have been a problem within the movement since its founding, particularly between the black rank and file and the predominantly mulatto leadership. Although President Neto is a Kimbundu and several of the top-level positions in his government are held by blacks--mostly Kimbundu but some Bakongo and Ovimbundu--the black rank and file have charged that a disproportionate number of positions at all levels of the government are occupied by mulattos. This dissatisfaction has resulted in significant racial stresses within the MPLA. (S)

The token Ovimbundu and Bakongo in the top leadership of the MPLA government do not reflect the tribal balance of the membership or support. They have been added to give the leadership better geographic and tribal balance. Although the MPLA draws some members from non-Kimbundu tribal groups, including Ovimbundu and southern Bakongo, the organization has been unable to attract significant support from UNITA or FNLA tribal areas. The MPLA, during its fight against the Portuguese, mobilized support from among the eastern tribes--especially from among the Chokwe-Lunda and Luene (Luvali) and Luchazi tribes of the Ganguela tribal group; multitribal fighting units were formed. These groups, as well as the Cuanyama from the south, are still represented in MPLA units today. But because the MPLA, unlike UNITA, is not a movement indigenous to the south and east, it is doubtful that the same level of support of the local tribes for the MPLA has carried over into the postindependence era. (C)

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### National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA)

The FNLA was formed in 1962 from two smaller liberation parties. Once a movement of considerable political and military influence, the FNLA has become weak and relatively ineffective in the past four years. The FNLA and its predecessor organizations have served primarily as vehicles for the reestablishment of the Bakongo Kingdom, which had straddled territory in Zaire, the Congo, and Angola, and had been broken up when the European colonial powers moved into the region several centuries ago. Holden Roberto, a Muchicongo from the Bakongo group, has been the leader of the FNLA since its inception. Jonas Savimbi, originally one of the leaders of the Front, left it in 1964 because of its Bakongo parochiality. The FNLA has over the years suffered other top-level defections, usually over the tribal issue. The Bakongo led an ill-fated revolt against Portuguese rule in 1961. They argued that the Bakongo tribal area was separate from the rest of Portuguese Angola to the south and that it had been unjustly joined to the rest of Angola in 1884. The FNLA, even more than UNITA or the MPLA, is seen by most Angolans as essentially a tribal association with little support outside of the Bakongo tribal group. (U)

### Conclusions

Based strictly on ethnic considerations (but keeping in mind that political loyalties don't rigidly follow ethnic lines), UNITA appears to have the greatest tribal support of the three organizations. It could probably reasonably claim the support of about 50 percent of the population; the MPLA could probably claim about 35 percent; the FNLA, no more than 12 percent. Based strictly on demography, UNITA and the MPLA appear to be more evenly balanced: UNITA can claim to dominate most of the countryside in the populous Benguela Plateau as well as the lightly peopled southeast; MPLA controls the cities as well as most of the fairly densely populated northwest and lightly populated northeast and southwest; FNLA is influential only in the far north. Because it is not possible to define accurately the areas under real control of each of the organizations, we can only draw a rough estimate of the populations living in the areas of influence of each group; UNITA, about 45 percent; the

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MPLA, 45 percent; and the FNLA, less than 10 percent. Taking only ethnic and demographic factors into consideration, UNITA appears to have slightly greater support than the MPLA. (C) (SECRET)

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RHODESIA: AN ANNOTATED CHRONOLOGY (U)  
(January 1979)

- 2 January Rhodesia publishes proposed constitution for Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, which ensures continued white dominance of the military, police, judiciary, and civil service, and gives whites 28 seats in the assembly, 10 seats in the senate, and four cabinet posts. (U)
- 8 January Rhodesians attack a Botswana defense force camp approximately 13 kilometers from the Rhodesian border. (U)
- Dennis Walker is sworn in as new white Co-minister of Internal Affairs in the transitional government, vice Rollo Hayman. Walker was elected to Parliament in 1974 and served as Deputy Minister of Education until April 1978. (U)
- 8-9 January ZAPU leader Nkomo visits Belgrade and meets with several party officials. (U)
- 8-12 January Chinese Vice Premier Li Xiennian visits Mozambique and meets with President Machel and ZANU leader Mugabe. Mugabe assures Li that ZANU has no intention of breaking relations with China in order to obtain military aid from the Soviet Union. (S NF NC OC)

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10 January           The first black conscripts report for training at Llewellyn Barracks near Bulawayo. Only 300 of the initial 1,500 blacks call up for duty report. Government sources claim that the new selective service scheme will produce a new manpower pool of about 25,000 blacks. (U)

12 January           Chief Chirau announces he will boycott the April elections unless private armies belonging to Bishop Muzorewa and Reverend Sithole are disbanded. (U)

12-16 January       Chinese Vice Premier Li Xiennian visits Zambia, meets with President Kaunda and Prime Minister Lisulo, and promises to speed the delivery of Chinese military aid to Zambia. (C)

12-20 January       A Patriotic Front delegation led by Joshua Nkomo visits Hanoi at the invitation of the Vietnamese. ZANU is not represented in the delegation. (U)

13 January           The Rhodesian Government places 15 more districts under military law, bringing 90 percent of the country under martial law. Salisbury and Bulawayo are the only major cities that remain unaffected. (U)

17 January           British Prime Minister Callaghan reports to Parliament that the Hughes Mission to southern Africa has concluded that an all-parties conference would be useless in the immediate future since a successful outcome would be unlikely. He added, however, that the UK would be prepared to call a conference if developments improve. (U)

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20 January Chief Chirau calls for a meeting between the leaders of the transitional government and the Patriotic Front, hopefully before the April national election. (U)

21 January ZAPU guerrillas force down a small Zambian military plane conducting aerial surveillance of ZAPU air defenses in the vicinity of Chinuny, Zambia, about 70 miles east of Lusaka. (S NF NC OC)

23-29 January ZAPU leader Nkomo visits Moscow. (U)

25-26 January Senior Botswanan and Rhodesian officials meet in South Africa to discuss mutual concerns over the increase in ZAPU operations into Rhodesia from Botswana. Rhodesian officials say they might attack concentrations of ZAPU guerrillas, but not before warning Botswana. (S NF NC OC)

30 January White Rhodesians approve the proposed majority-rule constitution by an 84-percent vote with a 72-percent turnout. (U)

31 January ZANU leader Mugabe addresses the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Conference, which opened in Maputo on 30 January, and asks for military assistance, including antiaircraft weaponry. (U) (SECRET NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-ORCON)

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ABSTRACTS OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS

Impact on Neighboring Black African States of Chad's  
Turmoil (U)\*

Chad's future evolution is of growing concern to surrounding black African states as the long struggle there between warring Muslim and non-Muslim factions appears to be becoming increasingly chaotic. Niger, Nigeria, Cameroon, and Central African Empire are reassessing their vulnerability to instability in reaction to what they see as the danger of growing fragmentation in Chad and intensified civil war along racial and religious lines. (S)

The concern of Chad's neighbors partly reflects a fear that the conflict there--if it intensifies and spreads--may generate border security problems and possibly lead to an influx of refugees. (S)

Bordering countries are worried that the status quo in central Africa--a bridge between Arab and black Africa--may be upset by the emergence of a Muslim-dominated regime in Chad that includes influential Libyan-oriented elements. (S)

The real underlying anxiety of adjacent states, all of which have Muslim populations of varying size, is that they may become more direct targets of Libyan activism in the future. (S)

Regionally influential Nigeria is seeking to play a more vigorous peacemaking role in Chad than it has in many previous African disputes. (S)

\*These key judgments are taken from Impact on Neighboring Black African States of Chad's Turmoil, RP 79-10121, March 1979. A copy of the entire text may be obtained from the author.

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Doubts about French determination to stick it out in Chad may cause moderate francophone states to look to the United States to be more responsive to their security needs and to seek better accommodation with Libya. (S)  
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